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Abstract
This work proposes the system for dynamic enforcement of access rights on Android. Each
suspicious application can be repackaged by this system, so that the access to selected
private data is restricted for the outer world. The system intercepts the system calls using
Aurasium framework and adds an innovative approach of tracking the information flows
from the privacy-sensitive sources using tainting mechanism without need of administra-
tor rights. There has been designed file-level and data-level taint propagation and policy
enforcement based on Android binder.
Abstrakt
Tato práce navrhuje systém pro dynamické vynucování přístupových práv pro platformu
Android. Každá podezřelá aplikace může být zabezpečena tímto systémem tak, že je
znemožněn únik citlivých dat mimo zařízení. Systém zachycuje systémová volání s použitím
Aurasium framework, a přidává nový přístup sledování informačních toků z citlivých zdrojů
s použitím systému značkování tak, aby nepotřeboval administrátorská práva. V práci bylo
navrženo sledování dat na úrovni souborů a obsahu souborů, a vynucování bezpečnostní
politiky vycházející z technologie Android binder.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Android’s fast growth of popularity has a lot of causes and consequences. Growing number
of applications, increasing number of devices and growing level of integration have been
interfered and influenced each other, implying increasing volume of the private data. People
have put their trust in their devices and become more dependent on mobile technologies,
using them for socialization, trading or entertainment. However, the private data is being
used for the profit still more often during globalization, because it is the base for the
knowledge-based business and targeted advertising. Even Google’s free Android generates
the significant part of its revenue just this way [36].
Since this asset is seized by many groups of people using illegal ways, Android has
become the most assaulted mobile operating system facing the wave of malware, which
is even more capable and stealthy, and can even establish a permanent presence on the
device [44]. In order to address these challenges, Android includes permission model that
protects access to sensitive resources. However, since permissions are overly broad and
misunderstood, applications are provided with more access than they truly require. In
particular, they are granted statically during install-time and thus do not correspond to
the actual use at the time. This implicates big vulnerability even if a certain application is
not intended to misuse the private data because it can be exploited.
Based on this insufficient built-in Android security and his later refinements, plenty of
third-party frameworks seek to supplement overall security. The current state of the art
comprises several effective countermeasures to issues like the coarse granularity of permis-
sions, over-claim of permissions and permission escalation attack. However, most of these
solutions are rather too complex and less straightforward. They replace the whole Android
permission model, or try to track the information flow on the level of the operating system
which requires the rooted device. In contrast, there is Aurasium framework, which auto-
matically repackage and harden chosen applications, interposing the sandboxing code in
the applications themselves. Nevertheless, it is robust enough to interpose almost all types
of interactions between the application and the operating system.
The aim of this work is to develop the system, which utilizes the Aurasium framework
and restricts the access of private data outside the device through the selected applications.
In contrast to original Aurasium framework, this work focuses more on the real asset, the
private data, and especially on the high usability and easy deployment. The solution is
focused on tracking the information flows from the privacy-sensitive sources to the system
sink where they aim to leave the system.
The first chapter, Android Security, deals with the two independent theoretical basis –
the state of art in Android and related Linux OS security as well as the comparison of
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third-party refinements. In the chapter Aurasium Framework, outputs of the Aurasium
framework research and code analysis are summarized. The next chapter, Analysis and
Design, describes the selected theoretical building blocks, decisions and design conducted
prior to the implementation. After that, the work performed during the project is being
overviewed in the chapter Software Development. The last chapter named Verification is
concerned with the testing methodology and evaluation of the overall project in detail.
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Chapter 2
Android Security
Android security has been built upon fundamental security concepts of operating systems
themselves. Since the security in general rests on the confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability as well-known concepts in IT security discipline, the OS security is also intended to
lower the probability of security incidents, especially their impact on the valuable assets it
manages [7, 24]. The purpose of an operating system is to create the interlayer between
computing hardware on one side and the users and their application-layer programs on the
other side. It manages hardware resources like processor, memory and hardware periph-
erals and creates an environment for users and application programs [40]. Therefore, OS
is essential software for overall security and privacy, since the security of user programs
cannot be better than the software layer that it utilizes underneath. In another case, even
secure and well-programmed applications can interrupt integrity and stability of the sys-
tem. Moreover, operating systems have been still improving and additional complexity
creates more vulnerabilities which can be exploited. Several users want to work in parallel
on multiple tasks, use various peripherals at the same time and still experience secure as
well as responsive system. To adapt to these requirements, a lot of security technologies
have and must have been integrated into modern systems including preemptive process
planning, advanced access control of memory resources and are required to recognize a
variety of peripherals on the way. Android, in addition, utilizes mandatory access control
and permission label model on the top of OS kernel and introduces several refinements for
secure programming. Based on insufficient built-in Android security, there are also plenty
of third-party frameworks which are intended to supplement overall security.
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, built-in Android security is
reviewed on the level of operating system, on the level of Android middleware architecture
and on the level of usage from developer’s perspective. This is included in sections Operating
Systems Concepts, Android Architecture and Security Policy Enforcement in that order.
The second part of this chapter is a literature review of security issues regarding built-in
security and their respective existing third-party countermeasures. There is also performed
analysis and comparison of this countermeasures. This is an objective of the sections
Analysis of Security Issues and Security Frameworks Comparison.
2.1 Operating Systems Concepts
In terms of operating systems, the main aim of security is to ensure that the processes in
an OS are protected from one another’s activities. To provide such protection, there are
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various mechanisms to ensure that only processes that have gained proper authorization
from OS can operate on the resources of a system. This is performed with basic capability-
based security concept – grant the lowest possible required permissions to every application
to perform its functionality without restricting other applications installed in the system.
This is known as the principle of least privilege (PLP). In security, there is a subject,
requesting for an access while using granted permissions and an object, data resource which
can define access permissions for the protection. Conceptually, if the subject requires access
to shared object, it must check if it has granted proper permission or in other words if it is
authorized. Otherwise, OS is blocking access. Furthermore, at any time, a subject should
be able to access only those resources that are currently required to complete its task. This
requirement is commonly referred to as the need-to-know principle [40]. Checking has been
usually performed via Access Control List (ACL) where the security policy is defined. This
mechanism is called Mandatory Access Control (MAC), because security policy is invariably
stored and mandatory enforced by the system. In contrast, Discretionary Access Control
(DAC) is less strict, and competence for defining a security policy is delegated to the user
and his discretion. The main information sources for this section are books Operation
System Concepts [40] and Modern Operating Systems [42].
Regarding security countermeasures in OS process management, processes in the mod-
ern operating systems have been administrated with preemptive process planning, concept
utilizing hardware mechanism – interruption. Preemptive planning ensures better stability
and security and is present on the majority of today’s operating systems. While in coop-
erative or non-preemptive multitasking, applications are equal and have the right to make
their own decision about needed processor time, preemptive multitasking uses the principle
of least privilege and the operating system is in charge to utilize time-division multiplex-
ing, assigning the small amount of time for each application. This prevents deadlock and
selfish misuse of resources by one application. As the computer cannot distinguish between
system code and application code by default, there must be cooperation with hardware.
The processor has been scheduled to interrupt application execution after time quantum
is expired and returns its operation to the planned block of code according to Interrupt
Vector Table containing addresses of following instructions after interrupting.
The Linux is considered as the main referential operating system nowadays since it is
the most used and taught system in the academic sphere. Linux kernel is currently part of
the uncountable desktop Linux distributions as well as the most mobile devices including
Android platform and other mobile operating systems such as Firefox OS [29], Chrome OS
[22] and Tizen [28]. From the security perspective, Linux utilizes a lot of security concepts
which are directly used by Android operating system and its security infrastructure.
A Linux-based system is a modular Unix-like operating system, deriving much of its
basic design from principles of Unix. It uses a Linux kernel, which handles access to the
file systems, peripherals and handles process control. It runs in protected kernel-mode and
is not accessible from application-layer programs running in the user-mode [fig. 2.1]. This
architectural approach to protection is technically called hierarchical protection domains
or protection rings and is contrasted to that of capability-based security approach. The
illustration is shown in figure 2.2 with the most common use of protection levels in italics.
The protection domain is a set of access rights, each of which is an ordered pair (<Object
Name>, {<Access Right>, ...}). The first element of the pair is the full identification of
exact physical hardware device (disk, printer, CPU, ...) or software object (file, program,
semaphore, ...). The second element is a set containing access rights which are dependent on
the particular object. The kernel provides an application interface to upper layers – kernel
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services. There is a possibility to request service execution by performing system call.
However, system calls are usually not invoked directly. Instead, most system calls have
corresponding C library wrapper functions which perform the required steps. Example
system calls are shown in the next figure.
Figure 2.1: Interaction Diagram of Linux Kernel1
Returning to process management in OS, there is other very important concept es-
pecially in terms of Android security. Processes executing concurrently in the operating
system may be cooperating processes. They can affect or be affected by other processes
and share their data with any other processes. Therefore, there is needed interprocess com-
munication (IPC) mechanism that will allow this kind of exchanging data. There are two
fundamental models of interprocess communication – shared memory and message passing.
In the shared-memory model, a region of memory that is shared by cooperating process
is established, while in the message-passing model, communication takes place by means
of messages exchanged between the cooperating processes. In client-server systems, there
are three other strategies for communication – sockets, remote procedure calls (RPC), and
pipes. The most important strategy in the context of this work, is RPC. The RPC was
designed as a way to abstract procedure call mechanism for usage between systems with
network connections. In many respects, it is similar to the IPC mechanism and it is usu-
ally built on top of such a system. However, in this case, message-based communication
scheme is used in order to deal with an environment in which the processes are executing
on separate systems.
The last selected security concept in OS, which will be mentioned, is related to the
storage management responsibility of OS. The operating system provides a uniform logical
view of stored information, abstracting from the physical properties of its storage devices
and defines a logical storage unit, the file. Since files and contained information are assets,
as described in the previous section, it must be kept safe from improper access ensuring
confidentiality as well as availability. The most common approach to this protection problem
is to make access dependent on the identity of the user as different users may need different
types of access to a file or directory. This identity-dependent access is implemented by
associating ACL with each file and directory. In the ACL, there are pairs with specified
user names and their corresponding type of allowed access. The main problem with this
type of access list is its length. If there is a need to allow everyone to read a file, there must
1Operating Systems course at BUT FIT
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be listed all users with read access. Therefore, UNIX system recognizes three classifications
of users in connection with each file – an owner, the user who created the file, a group, a set
of users who are sharing the file and need similar access and other, all other users in the
system.
Figure 2.2: Protection Rings in Operating Systems2
2.2 Android Architecture
Android OS [1] is the mobile operating system built upon Linux OS. OS is developed by the
Open Handset Alliance [33] (OHA) with the biggest supporter Google Inc. Open Handset
Alliance was established in 2007 when the Android SDK has already been publicly available.
OHA associates dozens of the biggest companies in software/hardware and telecommuni-
cations industry including mobile operators, software companies, handset makers and chip
makers [11]. It is currently the most popular mobile operating system with billions of de-
vices shipped. In addition, it is the main OS platform supporting the Internet of Things
(IoT) or Internet of Everything (IoE) environment, which has evolved from the convergence
of wireless technologies, micro-electromechanical systems (MEMS) and the Internet. This
is caused by deployment of Android on devices and things like tablets, phablets, smart
wearables (watches, fitness bands, glasses, virtual-reality devices, clothes, ...), health de-
vices (personal weight scales, thermometers, pedometers, blood pressure monitors), smart
toys, cars, kitchen and household appliances (fridge, freezer, washing machine), smart home
devices (smart bulbs, security systems, monitoring systems, security cameras), smart TVs
and other intelligent sensor devices. This also implies the main selling point of Android –
capability to easily extend online services to mobile devices. This extremely extensive
environment has been formed very quickly and Android system must be still evolving and
must ensure enhanced security.
Android security model has been built upon Linux security mechanisms listed in pre-
vious sections. The most important security mechanism is sandboxing. Sandboxing is a
mechanism to isolate applications from each other and from system resources. Application
isolation is done by means of assigning a unique user identifier (UID) to each application,
while the underlying Linux kernel enforces discretionary access control to resources (files
2Inspired by the book Operating system concepts [40]
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and devices) by user ownership [9]. Android uses reliable separation of processes in Linux
and utilizes it to separate user applications. Each application is primarily written in Java
programming language and is running on the similar virtual machine as Java Virtual Ma-
chine (JVM). Dalvik Virtual Machine [1] (DVM) has been developed due to adaptation
for systems with constrained resources like memory or processor speed. Each application
runs with its own DVM as stand-alone Linux process and under unique Linux user, so ap-
plication data is protected against access by other applications. Communication between
applications is realized by using Linux interprocess communication mechanism as has been
described before. From the perspective of the developer, communication between appli-
cations is the same as the communication between application components. Therefore,
it is important to know what the Android applications consist of. This literature review
is mainly security-oriented, but some additional details can be found in the earlier thesis
about Android [43].
Android SDK prepares four application components, java classes, which should be used
by developers during building their applications. Namely, it is Activity, Service, Broadcast
Receiver and Content Provider. These components are shown in figure 2.3. Each Android
application can use none or several components of each component type. There is one pos-
sible situation with one foreground application and one background application illustrated
in the figure, which can be started, but the user cannot see it and is not interacting with it
at the moment. Component type Activity is used for defining the user interface (UI) and
interaction with the user. There must be only one foreground Activity in the system at
the same time. Activity can already include all application logic, in the actual class, but
a better design is to include all application computing and data processing in a separate
class, java package or even in another Android application package. Another application
component, Broadcast Receiver has an intent to work like helm or steering wheel for other
applications. It can directly affect and control application processing and behaviour, but
it does not create UI. For instance, application for photo-editing can define Broadcast Re-
ceiver in order to start itself when another application wants to edit some picture, but
cannot do it alone. The Service is a component for data processing in the background
without UI, even if the application is not in the foreground. Service usually communicates
with a Web server and is performing time-consuming operations such as synchronizing ap-
plication data to cloud service. By default, all application components are performed in
single thread –UI thread or main thread. Therefore, it is necessary to create new thread
explicitly in this component so as to prevent the UI jams. The last component, Content
Provider, has been built upon SQL database, which it wraps and included data is made
available and addressed via an authority string embedded in a special content URI of the
form content://<authority>/<table>/[<id>] [15].
These application components interact with each other and use intent mechanism. In
Android, the Intent represents data which need to be processed with a meaning or a defi-
nition how it should be processed or what type of data it is. Example of intent is a picture
with “VIEW” action string. Action string defines action how the data should be processed.
Intent can be also imagined as a message which is sent from one component into the another
and it contains information with which intent the data should be processed in the receiver.
The list of standard Activity actions is depicted in table 2.1.
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Figure 2.3: Android Components
2.3 Security Policy Enforcement
Communication between components is maintained using Reference Monitor (RM), which is
part of Android OS Middleware. It ensures communication between applications separated
on the OS level and permission label mediation and mandatory access control (MAC). ACL
in Android OS is statically defined and user-authorized during installation and does not
provide an ability to further modify or grant the subset of manifested requested permissions
as it is possible in the Windows Phone OS. Reference Monitor, illustrated in the figure 2.5,
utilizes Inter-component Communication (ICC) similar to IPC in Unix-based systems.
However, in this case, ICC is performed via shared-memory IPC [sec. 2.1] and uses
special file /dev/binder representing special device node in Linux. Because the file must
be readable and writable for everyone due to proper operation, the Linux system has no way
of mediating it with its security mechanisms [15]. ICC is then performed via an input or
output control command on this special device node. Android utilizes this communication
in several different forms according to involved components which is shown in figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Forms of Component Interaction [37]
Security enforcement using MAC uses two types of permisions – granted permissions
(used or requested permissions) and required permissions (access permissions) [9]. Granted
permissions can be manifested during installation and are inherited by all of the applica-
tion’s components. On the other hand, required permissions are usually created by the
developer to protect their important components. Required permissions are always as-
signed to application components separately. In addition to this division, Android defines
four protection levels for each permission according to significance and actual meaning [1]:
∙ Normal – Low-risk permissions causing no harm to users. Permissions are automat-
ically granted when application declares request.
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Action Description
ACTION MAIN Start as a main entry point, does not expect to receive data.
ACTION VIEW Display the data to the user.
ACTION ATTACH DATA Indicate that some piece of data should be attached
ACTION EDIT Provide explicit editable access to the given data.
ACTION PICK Pick an item from the data, returning what was selected.
ACTION CHOOSER Display an activity chooser.
ACTION GET CONTENT Allow the user to select a particular kind of data and,return it.
ACTION DIAL Dial a number as specified by the data.
ACTION CALL Perform a call to someone specified by the data.
ACTION SEND Deliver some data to someone else.
ACTION SENDTO Send a message to someone specified by the data.
ACTION ANSWER Handle an incoming phone call.
ACTION INSERT Insert an empty item into the given container.
ACTION DELETE Delete the given data from its container.
ACTION RUN Run the data, whatever that means.
ACTION SYNC Perform a data synchronization.
ACTION PICK ACTIVITY Pick an activity given an intent, returning the class,selected.
ACTION SEARCH Perform a search.
ACTION WEB SEARCH Perform a web search.
ACTION FACTORY TEST Main entry point for factory tests.
Table 2.1: Standard Activity Actions [1]
∙ Dangerous – High-risk permissions which allows applications to access potential harm-
ful API calls. User is warned during installation time and must approve access to these
resources.
∙ Signature – A possible high-risk permission for some application. Permissions are
automatically granted when the requesting application is signed with the same cer-
tificate as the application, which defines the permission, is signed.
∙ Signature-or-system – A possible high-risk permission for Android system. Permis-
sions are automatically granted when the application is in the same Android system
image or is signed with the same certificate as the application which defines the per-
mission is signed.
Android restricts application interaction to its API, which uses permission label assign-
ment model [15]. Permission label is a simple text string representing granted or required
permission mentioned above. According to the documentation for Android developers,
there are currently 130 permissions defined in Android Developers page ranging from ac-
cess to a camera (CAMERA), full access to the Internet (INTERNET), dialing a phone number
(PHONE CALL), and even disabling the phone function permanently (BRICK) [1]. In addition
to Android defined permissions, application developers can also declare customized permis-
sions so as to protect their own critical resources. Permission label in Android does not have
exactly defined meaning and access to labels is not restricted [15]. This shortcoming causes
the main problems in Android security. All permissions are declared in Android Applica-
tion Package (APK) in the XML file called AndroidManifest.xml. Manifest file should
include the whole security policy and serve as ACL mentioned before [sec. 2.1]. However,
this is not entirely true, since Android designers have added several potentially confusing
refinements as the system has evolved. Some refinements push policy into the application,
others add delegation and that is why security analysts cannot discover an application’s
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policy simply by looking at it. APK file is merely a Java JAR archive containing except
AndroidManifest.xml the application’s code in the form of dex bytecode, compiled XML
resources such as window layout and string constant tables, and other resources like images,
sound and native libraries [44]. It also includes its own signature in a form identical to the
standard Java JAR file signatures.
Detailed principle of PAM is illustrated in figure 2.5. Required permissions are assigned
to system services. The service 𝑆𝐴 has assigned permission 𝑃1 and the service 𝑆𝐵 per-
mission label 𝑃2. Application 2 and application 3 are in the same sandbox, because they
are signed with the same key and they have been requested to share the same UID. Both
applications have granted permissions 𝑃1 and 𝑃3. This means, that every component in
every application in this sandbox has been allowed to access components with required per-
mission 𝑃1 or 𝑃2. Service in application 2 and service in application 3 can, therefore, access
the system service in system sandbox. Components without assigned required permission
have been unprotected and are accessible by any other application component. However,
the protected system service 𝑆𝐴 cannot be accessed by application 1 and the system service
𝑆𝐵 by application 2, because in their package any granted permission 𝑃1, respectively 𝑃2,
is not manifested
Figure 2.5: Permission Label Model3
Based on illustration for better understanding, a simple mathematical model can be
proposed.
Definition 2.3.1. Let 𝛽 be an overall security policy on Android. Then the 𝛽 is a binary
relation from a set of all installed applications 𝐴 to infinite set of all available and later
user-defined permissions 𝑃 . It can be also defined as a function from the set of installed
applications 𝐴 to the power set of set of permissions 𝑃 denoted as 𝒫(𝑃 ).
𝛽 : 𝐴→ 𝒫(𝑃 ), 𝛽 ⊆ 𝐴× 𝑃, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐴 = {𝐴1, 𝐴2, ..., 𝐴𝑛}, 𝑃 = {𝑃1, 𝑃2, ..., 𝑃𝑛} (2.1)
Each application has a minimal set of permissions needed for its operation and actually
3Adapted from Bugiel et al.’s article [9]
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requested by policy during install-time:
𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡 ∈ 𝒫(𝑃 ) (2.2)
𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛 ⊆ 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡 (2.3)
Properly defined security policy for Android application:
𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑚𝑖𝑛
.
= 𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑡 (2.4)
Statically defined permissions are too coarse-grained because combinations of permis-
sions could be required by any third-party application for its legitimate functionality, and
at the same time, these combinations of permissions could be harmful if they are exercised
by any malicious application in a specific sequence [5]. Based on previously defined model,
we can define a generic application runtime behaviour as a graph and specific snapshot
behaviour using sequence of permissions similarly:
Definition 2.3.2. An application runtime behaviour graph is a directed acyclic graph
(S:P) where S is a set of nodes representing states of an application, and P is set of edges
representing different permissions exercised.
Definition 2.3.3. Snapshot behaviour is sequence of permissions defined as ordered mul-
tiset:
𝑃𝑆𝑒𝑞 = (𝑃𝑖1 , 𝑃𝑖2 , ..., 𝑃𝑖𝑛), 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 ∀𝑥 ∈ {1, 2, ..., 𝑛} : 𝑖𝑥 ∈ {1, 2, ..., |𝑃 |} (2.5)
Permission sequence (𝑃𝑖1 , 𝑃𝑖2 , ..., 𝑃𝑖𝑛) can be rewritten to be more illustrative as:
𝑃𝑖1 → 𝑃𝑖2 → ...→ 𝑃𝑖𝑛 (2.6)
Definition 2.3.4. Let 𝛿 be a function that defines malicious behaviour. Then 𝛿 projects
arbitrary permission sequence to decision set D = {M, B}, where M and B represents malign
respectively benign sequence:
𝛿 : 𝑃𝑆𝑒𝑞 →𝑀,𝐵 (2.7)
For example if 𝑃1, 𝑃2 and 𝑃3 represents INTERNET, READ CONTACTS and
CALL PHONE permissions in that order, sample VOIP application could be considered to be
malicious respectively benign followingly:
𝛿(𝑃1 → 𝑃2 → 𝑃3) = 𝐵 (2.8)
𝛿(𝑃2 → 𝑃1 → 𝑃3) =𝑀 (2.9)
Regarding security refinements, Google developers, who designed Android, incorporated
several refinements to the basic security model. The main aim was to improve programmers
convenience and partially to include necessary hooks. Such refinements are permission
protection levels which have already been described. The first security refinement is related
to object-oriented paradigm and encapsulation principle. In Android, the component can
be marked as private which implies, that all external components are forbidden to access it
even if there is no required permission assigned [15]. This mechanism should be used on the
all internal components, because component without assigned required permission is always
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insecure and implicitly open. The next security refinement is the one of the necessity. It
is concerned to broadcast intents as they are vulnerable to permission escalation attack.
Permission escalation attack (PEA) can be categorized into Confused Deputy Attack (CDA)
and Collusion Attack (CA) [fig. 2.6]. CDA exploits unprotected interfaces of privileged
benign applications. For example, even if the application 1 in figure 2.5 cannot access
system service 𝑆𝐴 directly, because it has not been manifested and granted the permission
𝑃1, application can access the application 2 or 3 and misuse its granted permissions to
get where it has wanted. Another attack, CA, uses the principle of generating a joint set
of permissions from multiple malign applications. For example, if the application 1 was
granted permission 𝑃2, both the application 1 and 2 could collusively cooperate with the
aim to misuse the united permissions. CA requires the cooperation of multiple malign
applications using direct or indirect communication via third application or component.
Indirect CA can be performed not only by using overt channel, such as buffers, files or I/O
devices, but also covert channels including file locks, change of screen state or type of intents.
One of the covert channels can be also broadcast intent, since every application is capable
of reading every intent without restriction. For this vulnerability to be addressed, Android
has introduced broadcast intent permissions, which works in reverse as common granted
permissions. These permissions provide confidentiality of an author or creator of intent.
The Content Provider Permission refinement introduces finer-grain permission protection
enabling assignment of two permissions to one Content Provider component – READ and
WRITE. These permissions are automatically granted to requesting applications, which are
then allowed to perform enabled operation (none, read, write or read and write). Service
hooks enables finer granularity of RPC calls in Service component type and Protected APIs
forces security to resources, which are implemented directly without the use of API. This
is related to system services like a camera and other resources implemented directly upon
OS itself. [15]
Figure 2.6: Taxonomy of Permission Escalation Attack [16]
2.4 Analysis of Security Issues
Mass deployment of Android OS on the various devices [sec. 2.2] and increased popular-
ity have caused that a lot of developers, driven by popularity, reputation and proceeds,
have engaged developer community [11] which has implied a rapid increase in the number
of applications available in the Google Play Store. Simultaneously, the number of malign
applications has been increased. In the present, even regular user is capable of download-
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ing rooting application from an unofficial source and performing the permission escalation
attack disabling all security mechanism which were presented. Fortunately, there are some
promising third-party projects and frameworks, which are focusing on enhancing Android
security and preventing privacy leakage. The main information source for this chapter is
Fang et al.’s article [16].
From Fang et al.’s security analysis, some threats and vulnerabilities which could lead
to risk have been identified. These issues are summarized in the following figure [fig. 2.7].
The issues are divided into two categories – direct issues and indirect issues. Direct issues
are threats or vulnerabilities with a direct potential to lead to financial losses or to leak the
private user information. Indirect issues addresses system properties, people’s character-
istics or other circumstances which simplify misuse of the security model in Android and
thus, causes problems indirectly.
Figure 2.7: Relationship among Issues in Android Security [16]
Regarding Coarse Granularity of Permissions (CGP), Android defines permissions like
INTERNET, READ PHONE STATE and WRITE SETTINGS which provide an arbitrary accesses
to certain resources without further specification. For example, a lot of applications use
the INTERNET permission only for making HTTP(S) requests to specific domains or to
support Google AdSense. However, permission administrator must also provide access to
the other, possibly malicious, sites. Nevertheless, Android defines up to 300 permissions.
This high number, together with insufficient knowledge or lack of interest, is the main
factor of other indirect issue – Incompetent Permission Administrators (IPA). Permission
administrators are usually developers and they are interested in the working application
in any possible way, disregarding what is at risk for end-users. The last indirect issue,
Insufficient Permission Documentation (IPD), can be also based on a large number of
permissions as well as insufficient and imprecise documentation. Moreover, six errors are
already identified in the documentation as well as it lacks dual interpretation for users, of
which the technical description is often too complex and abstruse. All three mentioned
indirect issues illustrated in the figure explicitly lead to direct issue OCP.
Over-claim of Permissions (OCP) addresses the situation when the application requests
more privileges than it actually needs which can be misused and already identified as
malicious behaviour. This issue directly breaks the principle of the least privilege and
can be caused also by improper modular design where developers request for permissions
which should be requested by deputy applications. OCP can be induced maliciously or
unconsciously. Another direct issue, Permission Escalation Attack (PEA), is the main issue
addressed by a lot of third-party countermeasures and has been described in the previous
literature review. The last direct issue, the TOCTOU (Time of Check to Time of Use)
Attack, is vulnerability of system that disables modification of security policy during the
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time between checking of a condition (usually security credential) and use of the results of
that check. This time can be dilated by an attacker or the attacker can directly skip the
checking of a condition and use already granted authorization when it is the most suitable
for him. TOCTOU attack is possible due to two factors – no naming rule is applied to a
new permission in Android OS, and all permissions in Android are simple strings enabling
any two permissions with the same name to be treated as equivalent even if they belong
to unrelated applications. PEA and TOCTOU attack can be caused by indirect issue
Incompetent Permission Administrators indirectly or implicitly, because administrators do
not perform actual attack themselves.
2.5 Security Frameworks Comparison
Implementations of countermeasures to problems have been divided into several categories
according to respective addressed issues. Compared implementations address the three of
six mentioned issues –Coarse Granularity of Permissions (CGP), Over-claim of Permis-
sions (OCP) and Permission Escalation Attack (PEA). These categories have been further
divided to provide more detailed overview. Resulting categories and their overlapping have
been illustrated in figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8: Countermeasures according to Addressed Issue
Enforcement can be performed during install-time or during run-time. Install-time en-
forcement means that applications that do not pass the established policy are prevented
from being installed. On the other hand, run-time enforcement enables installation itself,
but dynamically prohibits access to protected system resources or other application com-
ponents. In that case, some applications exit unexpectedly with an exception, some can
continue their activity with false data provided, some can prohibit starting an application
in certain context. Also, information sources for establishing the policy rules are different.
Some applications use policies according to user wishes, some analyze all existing permis-
sions in the system or content of intents and creates rules accordingly to prevent various
attacks, some are defined statically. In addition, the each solution has been working on
the different layer of the Android OS [fig. 2.5] and only minority of them does not require
administrator privileges to the system. Also the information source for the decision making
about policy enforcement differs. It can be an author of application, a user of application or
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there are used existing security policies to decide whether to allow or block certain action.
Overview of some chosen countermeasures is in table 2.2.
Est. Prohibition Behaviour Policy Source Working Layer
Kirin [13, 14] 2009 Not Installed Application Statically defined Middleware
Saint [32] 2009 Not Installed Application Applications Middleware
Aurasium [44] 2012 Shown Dialog End-users Application
CRePe [5] 2011 Not Started Application End-users Middleware
Jeon’s Tools [26] 2012 Exception Thrown Applications Application
Apex [31] 2010 Exception Thrown End-users N/A
AppFence [25] 2011 Transparent End-users Middleware
TISSA [46] 2011 Transparent End-users Middleware
MockDroid [6] 2011 Transparent End-users Middleware
Flex-P [30] 2012 Exception Thrown End-users Middleware
XManDroid [9] 2011 Exception Thrown Content of Intents Middleware &Kernel
TaintDroid [12] 2014 Exception Thrown Applications Middleware
Table 2.2: Comparison of Selected Countermeasures
Implementations in the CGP category have the aim to modify built-in policy enforce-
ment using finer grains like IP address ranges, context information (location, time, system
settings), specific resources (files), specific intents (according to action strings), application
signatures, application versions or quantitative constraints like number of times a permis-
sion can be used. This category is further divided into Install-time CGP (IT-CGP) and
Run-time CGP (RT-CGP) as it is illustrated in figure 2.8. The representative of the first
category IT-CGP is Kirin [13, 14]. Kirin enforces install-time policy according to set of pre-
defined security rules based on permission combinations and permission and action string
combinations. Saint [32] is advanced solution with as install-time policy as a run-time pol-
icy enforcement. Saint uses AppPolicy provider which dynamically analyzes and identifies
the appropriate policies according to transient state of phone and context, such as location,
time, Bluetooth connection or connected devices. Aurasium [44] is together with the Jeon et
al.’s Tools [26] including RefineDroid, Mr. Hide and Dr. Android the only solution working
on the application layer without need of elevated privileges in the Android OS. However,
this is redeemed by worse usability because every application must be repackaged and re-
installed in order to work with this system. Aurasium’s policies are user-defined. System
uses blacklisting of IP addresses, protects against access to premium numbers and various
system resources. Aurasium run-time monitors, attached to the application, execute in the
same process as the application and hence are potentially subjects to circumvention. On
the other hand, Jeon et al.’s Tools use taxonomy and systic analysis tool (RefineDroid),
that infers the fine-grained permission usage. Applications are repacked by using the Dr.
Android (Dalvik Rewriter for Android) tool. Jeon et al.’s Tools suffer to performance slow-
down, because required interprocess communication by Mr. Hide (Hide Interface to Droid
Environment) tool is an expensive operation. However, Mr. Hide service runs in a separate
process, which is a little more secure than monitors in Aurasium. The last tool in the
CGP category is CRePE [5] which is focused on business sector and uses PolicyProvider
similar to Saint’s AppPolicy provider to enforce policy based on context – location, time
and temperature.
Countermeasures addressing the Over-claim of Permission issue are coping with two
problems – detection and analysis of permissions in Android permissions (OCP Detection)
and proposals of enhanced frameworks which allow users to revoke over-claimed permis-
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sions (OCP Revoke). Indirectly, all Coarse Granularity of Permissions issues are also Over-
clam of Permissions issues, however, OCP countermeasures are focused more on detection,
vulnerabilities in advertising libraries, granting of subset of permissions and limiting the
install-time Android’s permissions to secure system and protect against private-data misuse,
while the CGP solutions, in addition, provide enhanced granularity using contexts, signa-
tures, IP filtering or e.g. quantitative constraints. There is one solution overlapping with
the previous Coarse Granularity of Permissions category, Apex [31], introducing the condi-
tional grant of permissions. Apex enables selectively grant requesting permissions defined
in Android manifest (addressing OCP) using a simple interface provided by Poly. Dealing
with the issues related to Over-claim of Permissions, the user can specify constraints on
permissions, such as the number of times a permission can be used or the valid time per day
during which a permission should be allowed. Regarding OCP detection, Stowaway [17]
is solution for analyzing and detecting over-claimed permissions. Stowaway fuzes Android
APIs directly, while PScout [4], another solution, fuzzes the applications which use the API.
PScout finds the actual minimum set of required permissions according to application’s API
calls. AdDroid, AdSplit and Leontiadis et al.’s work [34, 39, 27] are dealing with advertising
libraries, because they are themselves are vulnerable to OCP issues. MockDroid [6] and
AppFence [25] restrict access to private data and reduce over-claimed permissions as well.
TISSA [46], in addition, provide four options when dealing with private data – keep public,
anonymize, provide fake result or provide empty result. Flex-P [30] allows not only to grant
a subset of permissions at install-time, but also to change it at run-time.
The last category, Permission Escalation Attack, involves tracking and controlling the
information flows through ICC between applications. Specifically, implementations use
ICC chains to prevent PEA attacks like confused-deputy attacks or collusion attacks. All
solutions address the confused deputy attack, but none of them fully addresses the collu-
sion attack. However, XManDroid [9] and TaintDroid [12] partially address overt channel
communication and XManDroid, in addition, partially address also covert channels com-
munication in the collusion attack. The first representative, TaintDroid is dealing with
PEA issue as well as OCP issue. It tracks information flows by labeling (tainting) data
from privacy-sensitive sources. Afterwards, the user is alerted when any tainted data aim
to leave the system at a taint sink. XManDroid (eXtended Monitoring on Android) tracks
and analyzes the communication links among applications, and ensures that the applica-
tion comply to a desired policy. Speciality of this implementation is making the policy
decisions based on the content of intents. For example, application that is notified about
incoming or outgoing calls and can record audio must not communicate to an application
with network access. QUIRE [10] is lightweight provenance system primarily aimed to
defend against the confused deputy attack. It also tracks and record the specific ICC call
chain so that the recipient can observe the full call chain associated with a request. QUIRE
lies on the middleware layer as well as on the kernel layer in order to be able to analyze
remote procedure calls. The other solution, IPC Inspection [18] has been based on a simi-
lar principle – tracking information flows through ICC. The last compared representative in
this category, Sorbet [19], allows developers to define policies to mitigate undesired infor-
mation flows via tracking the permissions of all components on a call stack. Returning to
figure 2.5, when the service 𝑆𝐴 protected by permission 𝑃1 is called by the 𝑆3 which would
be hypothetically called by 𝑆1, Sorbet evaluates if every component on the call stack has
the permission 𝑃1 granted – so not only application 3 containing the service 𝑆3, but also
application 1 and their respective service 𝑆1 is checked.
To supplement this enumeration and provide another categorization view, there exist
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also Yuksel et al.’s comparison [45]. They classify all software-based solutions into four
groups. These include operating system (OS) based, source code based and application or
service based solutions and permission-based. The first category includes solutions which
make changes on the operating system architecture. Studies under second category provide
solutions by processing the byte-code of applications being based on analysis techniques or
modification of byte-code and rebuilding the applications. The application or service-based
examines the system as a background process or analysis is performed either manually
or through the use of an application. The last group, permission-based solutions, aims
to provide permission-based filtering and removes permissions that are considered to be
harmful. Yuksel et al.’s team has performed assessment based on the following software-
engineering criteria:
∙ Overhead – Does the solution cause overhead on the users’ mobile devices?
∙ Usability – Is the proposed solution user-friendly?
∙ Independency – Is proposed solution device dependent?
∙ Availability – Is proposed solution available to end-users?
Overhead Usable Independent Available
Operating System Based No Yes No Yes
Permission Based Yes Yes No No
Source Code Based Yes No No No
Application Based Yes Yes No Yes
Service Based No Yes Yes Yes
Table 2.3: Findings of Yukse’s et al. Assessment [45]
2.6 Jeon et al.’s Tools
A more detailed description of all compared frameworks is not possible because it is already
beyond the scope of this work. However, it is beneficial to present detail of at least one
solution in contrast to Aurasium, to obtain more critical view on the Aurasium framework
itself. The chosen suitable framework is the bundle of Jeon et al.’s Tools. This is the most
similar framework, which also does not require any modification to the Android platform. It
includes Dr. Android and Mr. Hide tools by Jeon et al. In addition, RefineDroid supposed
in this project supports these tools as analyzer tool. Jeon et al.’s Tools propose new per-
mission model based on 7 selected most problematic coarse-grained permissions – INTERNET,
READ PHONE STATE, WAKE LOCK, ACCESS FINE LOCATION, ACCESS COARSE LOCATION,
WRITE SETTINGS and READ CONTACTS. These permissions are replaced by the finer ones,
which are however sufficient in most cases. For example, READ PHONE STATE is replaced by
Mr.Hide’s permission UniqueID which returns randomly generated ID number (IMEI or
IMSI) instead of whole state only [26]. Essential for this concept is, that new fine-grained
permissions can be easily added over time. Tools are proposed to have different vocabu-
lary of permissions for different applications and/or users, because everybody has different
privacy requirements. In contrast to Aurasium project, Jeon et al.’s Tools are enforced in
separate application process using the Mr. Hide application. Architecture of Mr. Hide is
shown in figure 2.9a. Fundamentally, Dr. Android removes selected permissions and since
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the Android’s permission mechanism is robust enough to mediate also native code, it no
longer has the access granted by the platform permission. Thus the application is rewritten
to access these resources via Mr. Hide application which can perform mediation. Applica-
tion is rewritten using the apktool similarly as in the Aurasium, however, Dr. Android also
concatenates hidelib.dex, an adapter layer to connect to the Mr. Hide service. In Dr. An-
droid must be rewritten also some other XML resources to support Mr.Hide’s AdsPrivate
and AdsGeo permissions which replace coarse-grained INTERNET permission with permis-
sions to display ads without sharing personal information. The process of repackaging is
shown in figure 2.9b. Some shortcoming against Aurasium project is performance slowdown
imposed by Mr. Hide, since the interprocess communication required by it is an expensive
operation. The major drawback is, however, the availability of source code, since the only
open-sourced tool is Dr. Android (redexer), and the required Mr. Hide part is used for
developers’ revenue. [26]
(a) Mr. Hide
(b) Dr. Android
Figure 2.9: Jeon et al.’s Tools Architecture [26]
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Chapter 3
Aurasium Framework
Aurasium project has been developed in 2012 as a project at the University of Cambridge,
UK [44]. Aurasium uses repackaging mechanism, wrapping around the DVM under which
the Android applications run, with monitoring code. It does not require rooted Android
device. To attach sandboxing code, Aurarium exploits Android’s unique application archi-
tecture of mixed Java and native code execution and introduces libc interposition code.
Because of this, Aurasium is capable to mediate almost all types of interactions between
the application and the Android OS.
This project consists of three parts – automated repackaging system written in Python
programming language named pyAPKRewriter, monitoring code included in ApkMonitor
application that intercepts an application’s interactions with the system and Aurasium’s
Security Manager (ASM) application enabling central handling of policy decision of all
repackaged application on the device [44].
Starting with sandboxing code, the top layer of the framework is written in Java. The
aim is to create a well-documented easy-to-use abstraction layer upon cumbersome native
layer of the framework. The upper layer creates interface for other possible programs
and delegates all requests to the low-level part of the framework implemented in a native
C++ code. This layer consists of few shared objects that do all the real work, such as
communication with the Dalvik VM or establishing the mechanism for IPC communication.
Figure 3.1a shows in detail the layers of the framework library in individual applications’
Logical Address Space (LAS).
(a) Framework Structure
(b) Rapackaging System
Figure 3.1: Aurasium Architecture [44]
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The second part of Aurasium, the repackaging Python script utilizes the previously
mentioned sandboxing code and deploys it to Android APK installation package. APK
file is similar to Java JAR archive and contains AndroidManifest file, application logic in
the form of dex bytecode, compiled XML resources and native libraries. Each application
package is also signed with authorship information. According to figure 3.1b, besides the
sandboxing code, Aurasium has to include also several additional parts to APK in order to
ensure the functionality.
The last part of the Aurasium is called Aurasium Security Manager (ASM). ASM han-
dles the policy decisions centrally, so that all repackaged applications can be maintained at
one place. Security policy is based on decision of application or user. Application decision
works transparently without user interaction, while the user decision is consented by dialog
window and can be remembered and used by default during next occurrence.
Since the project is introduced and publicly documented in [44] only superficially, the
greater part of the information must be obtained by research or source code analysis.
3.1 Principle of Mediation
Aurasium mediation has been based on the interposition code of Android’s standard C
library called libc [44]. This library is called every time the upper layer framework library
wants to interact with the OS itself. It is located directly upon the Linux kernel and initiates
appropriate system calls into the kernel that completes the required operation.
The library is mapped in Logical Address Space of each process of every Android ap-
plication using dynamic linking mechanism. Dynamic linking is maintained by C++ ld.so
linker, which interconnects arranged compiled code of libc library with the framework li-
braries code in the LAS. In the Linux as well as Android OS, each compiled library located
in the LAS, as well as a shared object file on the disk, is in the ELF format, so that the
library could be shared and therefore mapped anywhere in the LAS, Position Independent
Code (PIC) has been used. For this purpose, ELF object file dispose Dynamic Symbol Table
(DST) in .dynsym section containing all of the file’s imported and exported symbols used
by linker to fill the pre-prepared read-write pages. Specifically, .got and .dynamic sections
are used – .dynamic section is used for tagging the values during linking and the .god section
contains Global Offset Table (GOT). GOT is used by stub functions in Procedure Linkage
Table (PLT) to retrieve the real target address of the remote function. Since the Global
Offset Table is located in the fixed distance from the text segment, instructions in the
code can jump to correct GOT entry even if the library has been mapped in the arbitrary
address. Firstly, the linker collects and maps all the libraries code and data into the LAS
of process and after that, it fills the Global Offset Table with absolute addresses to ensure
communication between modules and libraries. Overview of mapping into LAS is shown in
figure 3.2. [35]
Therefore, Aurasium goes through every loaded ELF file and overwrites its GOT entries
with pointers to its monitoring functions [44]. Functions themselves then mediate calls to
actual library functions after they have completed monitoring, if necessary. Because there
is no direct possibility to direct LAS modification using Java code, Aurasium implemented
these interposition routines in C++, exactly as the ld.so loader is implemented. This is
possible due to Android’s Native Development Kit (NDK) and Java Native Interface (JNI)
which ensures interaction between Java and native C++ code.
The mediation is used to dynamically monitor the application behaviour and enforce
the finer-grained security policy. Aurasium introduces policies that protect the devices from
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Figure 3.2: Mapping into Process’s Address Space
untrusted applications and their attempts to access sensitive information, leaking to the
outside world or modifying it, to abuse SMS service or network connection as well as to
escalate privilege and gain the root access [44]. All these refinements against standard built-
in security policy in Android can be categorized into 3 categories –Privacy Policy, Network
Policy and Privilege Escalation Policy. The purpose of the Privacy Policy is to enhance
users’ privacy. This is related to accessing the private data as the IMEI, IMSI, phone
number, location, SMS messages, phone conversations or contact list [44]. The Network
Policy enables finer-grained interaction with the network. For example, only particular web
domains or set of IP addresses can be accessed. Furthemore, Aurasium proposes also IP
blacklisting provided by the Bothunter [41] network monitoring tool to harvest information
about malicious IP addresses. The last category, Privilege Escalation Policy, is used to
secure the vulnerability introduced by Aurasium interposition.
3.2 Static Analysis
Aurasium’s code is distributed under GNU General Public License and freely available on
the GitHub server. Currently, analysis of the code is the only way to obtain more detailed
information about this framework. The most important part of it is the native Android
application called ApkMonitor. ApkMonitor contains all the sandboxing code, that is later
attached to selected application which should be hardened.
The most profound part of ApkMonitor is written in C/C++ language and is called
Aurasium Native Library (ANL). It contains two types of code – the code for preparing the
interposition during startup and the code performing the mediation. The interposition code
must be executed before any Android component is started so that the solution is robust
enough. Android API prepares the Application component for this purpose, which is called
before every component like Activity and can be used to include global initializations for an
application. However, the most of the applications do not need to utilize this component,
which is used in Aurasium. Aurasium must include this component (ApiHook.java) also in
the AndroidManifest declarations. Since the implementation must rewrite the LAS of the
application’s process, it must be performed in the C/C++ language (apihook.cpp). The
first operation is the analysis of LAS and reading of the memory sections (stored in memmap
array). In the next step, each ELF file is accordingly mapped into soinfo structure, which
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is used for patching and relocation of the addresses of libc functions to “hook” functions.
A “hook” function (files starting with “hook ” prefix) represents the second type of native
code – code performing the mediation. These function replaces the standard libc functions
with mediation code and delegates further processing to lower layers in the end. This
process is illustrated in figure 3.3a.
(a) Modified Implementation
(b) Rapackaging Script
Figure 3.3: Aurasium Static Analysis
Aurasium Native Library (ANL) must be supplemented by Aurasium Java Code (AJC)
and new declarations in the AndroidManifest file. Aurasium tries to minimize the amount of
native code, because it is generally difficult to write and test. For that reason, AJC contains
all the policy logic and has been built upon many helper functions in the standard Android
framework. However, including Java code into existing APK package is not trivial and
requires some intermediate steps. In Android, all application Java code must be compiled
to single file classes.dex which contains bytecode for DVM similarly to Java Class file,
but contains all compiled Java files. Therefore, there is a need to disassembly the DEX file,
insert Aurasium’s sandboxing code and re-assembly it back to create the new classes.dex
file. Fortunately, there exist open-source reverse-engineering tools to perform such tasks,
which will be examined and overviewed in the following section. This tool is also used in
Aurasium [11]. Regarding AndroidManifest.xml file, all components started in application
must be declared in it and therefore, also modification of this file is part of repackaging
the APK file. The principle of this approach is to attach Application class declaration in
manifest file which will be instantiated by the runtime whenever the application is about
to start. This enforces the GOT change (delegating the ANL) before any other parts of the
original application run.
The second part of Aurasium, automated repackaging script, utilizes a combination of
effective text processing of Python programming language and exploitation of Java and
binary third-party console applications for Android development and hacking, which will
be analyzed in next chapter in more details. All parts are interconnected by using Bash
Unix shell interpreter as it is shown in figure 3.3b. In the first phase, the content of
APK file is validated (using script Singer.py) and obtained using reverse-engineering tool
apktool.jar. The next part is unzipping the ANL and launching the RewriterMain.py
script, which injects the monitoring code. This essential script copies the ANL native
code into /jni folder and adds new <Application> declaration in AndroidManifest.xml.
In the next step, the APK file is packed again. Finally, the last part of the system is a
Python script for the application singing since every application is required to have a valid
signature. Signature in Android does not ensure the data integrity or confidentiality, but
serves as proof of authorship. For example, user-defined permissions of signature protection
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level type are granted automatically to the application packages with the same signature.
Thus, Aurasium re-sign applications using a new self-signed certificate maintaining a one-
to-one mapping between original certificates and equivalence classes of authorship among
applications. Anyhow, this case is unique and Aurasium is usually applied to a standalone
application where application updates and cooperation are not common.
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Chapter 4
Analysis and Design
Apart from the theoretical outcomes, the aim of this thesis is to design the exemplary
solution which would practically contribute to the security of Android platform. From the
assignment, there are two main requirements – the first one defines the way, the second one
defines the goal. Starting with the goal, the focus is aimed at the private user data and
its restriction outside the device. The restriction should be performed without affecting
the original behaviour of application, which implies dynamic policy enforcement and use
of tainting mechanism, which will be later analysed in detail. Since this project is specific
in its scope, hardening selected applications rather than whole system, restriction the data
provision to other applications and system components become the most important. Due to
the theoretical amount of work, the implementation is focused mainly on files and tracking
its duplicates which could be also provided to sensitive Android components which are
called before leaving the system. The data can be leaked through six types of media:
∙ Data Cable – Mobile device is connected and mounted to computer as USB device
and data are leaked by copying.
∙ Wi-fi – Data are leaked through the socket interface using TCP/IP stack.
∙ Bluetooth – Data are shared using Bluetooth protocol similarily than Wifi.
∙ Mobile Network – Data are send via GSM Teleservices (standard call service), Short
Message Service (SMS), or Data Services (GPRS, EDGE, UMTS).
∙ Audiovisual Components – Data are leaked through various output display and
sound components of mobile devices and perceived through sensory organs or recorded
using input devices (e.g. capturing the screen)
∙ Other Techniques – This includes stealing of physical device and its disassembling
as well as other types of unusual acquisition.
The most risky media are the mobile and wireless networks, because they are the most
probable way of leakage and they are also concern of this work.
The second part of requirements are the requirements which define the way which should
be used in order to accomplish previously mentioned aims. The work should be built upon
the Aurasium framework and accomplish the policy enforcement using the monitoring sys-
tem calls. Android contains monitoring hooks for several system calls which are overviewed
in the following table:
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Network IPC System File
connect() ioctl() dlopen() open() fopen() read()
getaddrinfo() close() fork() write()
Table 4.1: Intercepted System Calls in Aurasium
From this set, the system calls ioctl(), open(), fopen(), read() and write() were
identified as suitable for this project. Starting with read() and write() functions, this
functions are performing the reading and writing to file and their usage is straightforward.
The functions are reading or writing from/to file identified with file descriptor (integer
parameter) and using the memory identified by pointer (void * parameter). Functions use
only limited memory defined by the third parameter. The system calls open() and fopen()
are The next system call, ioctl(), performs a variety of control functions on STREAMS
devices (defined by first parameter). Each device defines own set of supported commands,
which are passed to this function as a second parameter. The following parameters are
used without universal semantics and are also device-specific and contains additional data
needed by certain device. Android uses this system call to implement its IPC, which is even
more robust than standard Linux IPC and provides the communication between Android’s
components and is even used for various system events as touch control. Implementation
is ensured by Android’s Binder class and is analyzed in the next section in more details.
In general, each remote call (between components) is mapped into corresponding call of
ioctl() function. The data parameters uniquely define the destination class, called method
and data and is provided in special format on the address specified by the third parameter,
which will be also the subject of further examination. The searching of relevant classes and
methods is objective of experiments with the original system.
In addition to this theoretical basis, which addresses the way and goal of project, there
has to be performed also analysis of Android’s and third-party console tools, which are
essential part of the Aurasium project and must be considered as building blocks during
the design of system.
Since a lot of information in this chapter is obtained during experiments, which are
described as a part of development phase in Software Development chapter, research work
in this chapter is interspersed in time with the practical work described in the next chapter.
4.1 Android Binder
In order to perform the required mediation, the part of Android middleware called the
Binder needs to be rewritten. The Binder was originally developed under the name Open-
Binder [2] by Be Inc. and later under Palm Inc. and provides high-level abstraction on
the top of traditional modern operating system services including the facility to provide
bindings to functions and data from one execution environment to another [37]. In An-
droid, OpenBinder is customized to provide Inter-component Communication as has been
described before. All interposition code needs to be placed in the suitable position in the
original Binder implementation. Therefore, there is important to understand the concepts
and to analyse the architecture of this part of system.
The communication between two processes is ensured using Binder Objects (BO), which
are instances of classes that implement ioctl-based Binder interface. The most important op-
eration which is declared in this interface is transact(int code, Parcel data, Parcel
reply, int flags). The corresponding callback method in the Binder object is called
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onTransact(). The interface can be further extended by additional business operations
using Android Interface Definition Language (AIDL) [20]. Each BO uses local and global
identifier. The local ID is unique in the process and the global ID is created when the BO
is passed to another process using Binder Driver (BD). The BD then works like network
switch and persists the mapping from local ID to global ID in the table structure and trans-
late it transparently, similarly than the mapping using ARP protocol. The Binder frame-
work communication uses the client-server model. However, the process can implement the
server, as well as the client, so the communication can be still bidirectional. The Binder
Client (BC) invokes an operation on a remote Binder object called Binder Transaction
(BT), which may involve sending or receiving data over the Binder Protocol. The commu-
nication is performed indirectly using Binder Driver. In the Android, the Binder Driver
is exposed via /dev/binder file and simple API based on open(), release(), poll(),
mmap(), flush() and ioctl() operations. Most communication happens via ioctl(int
fd, unsigned long request, ... method. The first parameter is the file descriptor
number which identifies currently open file and is used in /proc/<pid>/fd/<fd> file. The
second parameter specifies the ioctl() command. The main commands are as follows [37]:
∙ BINDER WRITE READ – sends zero or more Binder operations, then blocks waiting to
receive incoming operations and return with a result,
∙ BINDER SET WAKEUP TIME – sets the time at which the next user-space event is sched-
uled to happen in the calling process,
∙ BINDER SET IDLE TIMEOUT – sets the time threads will remain idle,
∙ BINDER SET REPLY TIMEOUT – sets the time threads will block waiting for a reply until
they time out, and
∙ BINDER SET MAX THREADS – sets the maximum number of threads that the driver is
allowed to create for that process’s thread pool.
In fact, most communication happens via
ioctl(binderFD, BINDER WRITE READ, &bwd) operation, where the binderFD is used to
access the /dev/binder file and the bwd structure is defined as in figure A.1 and illustrated
in figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Semantics of binder write read Structure1
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The write buffer contains a series of commands for the driver to perform, while the
read buffer contains commands for the BO in user-space. The commands for driver are
called Binder Call (BC) commands and the commands for the BO are called Binder Return
(BR) commands. Each command is couple (operation code, data). These couples are stored
in binder transaction data structure A.2. If the transaction is inline, the data is directly
contained, otherwise, it contains a pointer to the data buffer.
The list of available commands, which can be stored in write buffer respectively
read buffer is shown in following table 4.2:
write buffer read buffer
BC TRANSACTION, BC REPLY, BR NOOP, BR TRANSACTION COMPLETE,
BC ACQUIRE RESULT, BC FREE BUFFER, BR INCREFS, BR ACQUIRE, BR RELEASE,
BC INCREFS, BC ACQUIRE, BR DECREFS, BR TRANSACTION, BR REPLY,
BC RELEASE, BC DECREFS, BR FAILED REPLY, BR DEAD REPLY,
BC INCREFS DONE, BC ACQUIRE DONE, BR DEAD BINDER, BR ERROR,
BC ATTEMPT ACQUIRE, BC REGISTER LOOPER, BR OK, BR ACQUIRE RESULT, BR FINISHED,
BC ENTER LOOPER, BC EXIT LOOPER, BR ATTEMPT ACQUIRE, BR SPAWN LOOPER,
BC REQUEST DEATH NOTIFICATION, BR CLEAR DEATH NOTIFICATION DONE,
BC CLEAR DEATH NOTIFICATION,
BC DEAD BINDER DONE
Table 4.2: Binder Driver Commands
The Binder Transaction is a passing data from the client to the service, while the Binder
Reply is a passing data from the service back to the client. This is shown in figure 4.2a.
The whole Binder framework mechanism is transparent for the Android developer, since the
Binder Transaction is performed as a local function call using so-called thread migration.
This is ensured by the proxies and stubs, which are auto-generated helper classes from
the AIDL files. The proxy, as it is illustrated in figure 4.2b, is the helper class which
transforms Java code to low-level commands for the Binder Driver. The stub works in
reverse to proxy and automatically parses and performs read commands on the service
side. Since the Binder Driver is implemented on the low layer using C language, there has
to be mechanism for encapsulation of high-level Java objects. This is ensured by Parcel
container and corresponding Parcelable interface. A procedure for converting this higher-
lever applications data structures into parcels is called marshalling. The marshalling, as
well as unmarshalling, is also in the responsibility of the proxies and stubs.
(a) Binder Driver Interaction
(b) Abstract Binder Communication
Figure 4.2: Binder Architecture2
1Inspired by Artenstein et al.’s article [3]
2Inspired by Schreiber’s article [37]
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4.2 Command Line Tools
All Android projects and mainly this project, as well as original Aurasium framework itself,
would not be possible without third-party tools. It includes developer tools provided as
a part of the Android platform, but also the hooking, instrumentation and static analysis
tools which are usually standalone open-source projects.
A detailed analysis of all existing tools is not possible, however, there has been identified
and described some most important tools with regard to this project. Android Debug Bridge,
a command line tool needed for development and especially for the communication with
the physical or emulated device, is essential in this project, because the profound part of
obtaining the information needed for design and implementation are experiments, which
are performed due to this instrument. The second very important tool in this category
is the Device Monitor, which enables tracking the file system and provides also graphical
tools for debugging and analysis of Android applications. The part of Android SDK is also
the third selected tool, Android Asset Packaging Tool, for managing the content of APK
files. The next described tools are static analysis tools Smali and Baksmali, which are
utilized in repackaging script for unpacking the Class files for injection. The last reverse-
engineering tool, Apktool, is higher-lever utility which simplifies the use and wraps the other
tools together. Information is based on Android Hacker’s Handbook book [11] and on the
manuals and documentations provided with the tools.
Android Debug Bridge
Android Debug Bridge (ADB) is universal tool for command line, which enables communi-
cation with emulator or the physical device with Android OS. This client-server application
contains three parts:
∙ A Client – which runs on development machine and can be invoked from a shell by
issuing an adb command.
∙ A Server – which runs as a background process also on the development machine
and manages communication between the client and the adb daemon running on an
emulator or device.
∙ A Daemon – which runs as a background process on each emulator or device instance
[1].
When the ADB Client is started and server process is not already running, it starts the
server process, which subsequently binds to local TCP port 5037 and listens for commands
send from all adb clients. The actual communication between development machine and
the physical or emulated device is performed between the ADB Server and Deamon using
the odd-numbered ports in the range 5555 to 5585, the range used by emulators or devices.
The even-numbered port is assigned to each device for console connections. ADB Server
handles commands to all connected devices. The selection of some ADB commands is
shown in table 4.3.
Device Monitor
Android Device Monitor (ADM) is a stand-alone tool that provides a graphical user interface
for several Android application debugging and analysis tools. The Monitor tool does not
33
Category Command Description
General devices Prints a list of all attached instances.
help Prints a list of supported ADB commands.
Debug logcat Prints log data to the screen.
Data install Pushes an Android application to an instance.
pull Copies file from an instance to the computer.
push Copies file from the computer to an instance.
Networking forward Forwards socket connections from local port toa remote port on the instance
Server start-server Starts the ADB server.
kill-server Terminates the ADB server.
Shell shell Starts a remote shell in the target instance.
Table 4.3: Android Debug Bridge Commands [1]
require installation of an integrated development environment (IDE) [1]. ADM encapsulates
the following tools:
∙ Dalvik Debug Monitor Server (DDMS) – debugging tool, which provides
printscreen of device, informations about threads, state of RAM memory, incoming
calls, SMS messages as well as file system.
∙ Tracer for OpenGL ES – tool for OpenGL Embedded Systems (ES) code analysis
in Android application. This tool enables OpenGL ES commands and screen catching
∙ Hierarchy Viewer – enables debugging and optimization of GUI providing the visual
representation of component hierarchy.
∙ TracerView – a graphical viewer for execution logs saved by your application, which
helps to debug the application and profile its performance [1].
Smali and Baksmali
Smali (resp. Baksmali) is an assembler (resp. equivalent disassembler) for Dalvik Virtual
Machine. DVM executes instructions represented in Dalvik bytecode and stored in Dalvik
executable (DEX) format. This tool works similarly as the ordinary assembler for physical
machine, but it converts files from Java assembler language called Smali to DEX format.
Illustration of this principle is shown in figure 4.3. Smali syntax is based on Jasmin and
dedexer. Jasmin is the standard assembly format for Java, dedexer is another DEX file
disassembler like Smali, which is focuesd on Dalvik operation codes.
Figure 4.3: Smali Principle
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Android Asset Packaging Tool
Android Asset Packaging Tool (AAPT) is a tool for managing the content of Android APK
files. It can view, create, and update Zip-compatible archives (zip, jar, apk) and also
compile resources into binary assets. This tool is the part of Android SDK used every
time the developer wants to generate new APK file, since it is the base builder for Android
aplications.
Apktool
Apktool is an universal Android reverse-engineering tool which also utilizes and wraps the
Smali and Baksmali tool as well as AAPT. The tool can unpack the existing APK files into
the original resources contained in them in human-readable XML form. It can also produce
disassembly output of all classes and methods using Smali. Apktool creates project-like file
structure and includes also embedded Smali debugger.
4.3 System Design
Design of the system is based on previous analysis and various experiments, which were
focused on the Android system behaviour. Design consists of three parts – design of archi-
tecture and principle of application, design of data structures and design of configuration.
Design of architecture can be further divided into two parts – design of tainting mechanism
and design of restriction.
Starting with the overall architecture and tainting principle, the tainting is based on
the principle used in TaintDroid architecture shown in next figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Tainting Principle [12]
In order to perform real memory-level tainting, there has to be tracked each atomic
memory transfer, which from a programmer’s point of view means that each assignment
to a variable. This can be done only through monitoring of instructions on the level of a
machine. In TaintDroid, there are monitored instructions on the level of virtual machines,
because all possibly harmful applications are run under Dalvik virtual machine. TaintDroid
uses Virtual Taint Map (VTM), which mirrors the address space, but does not contain the
content of the memory. It represents the division of memory into a protected (black square
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in figure 4.4) and a public (white square) part. Before tainting process, the tainted files
are marked in VTM. Then, every copying of memory invokes copying of blocks in VTM.
Since the applications, which run on separate DVM can also exchange data, TaintDroid
introduces message-level tainting as well.
In this project, there have been designed and integrated two granularities of taint prop-
agation – file-level tainting and data-level tainting. The message-level tainting (between
components) principle from TaintDroid is used only for final policy enforcement (restric-
tion), because Aurasium intercepts only single applications and does not have possibility to
monitor the unhardened ones. File-level tainting and data-level tainting use the previously
mentioned concept of VTM, but it is stored in higher-level abstract data structure and file
instead of VTM.
File-level tainting between memory and the OS’s file system can be performed in a full
scope, because Aurasium can fully intercept this communication using system calls fopen(),
open(), write() and read(). Function fopen() is used for obtaining the opening mode as
is described in 5.2. This is used for designed Tainting Customization (TC). If the untainted
memory is written to tainted file in append mode, the files remain tainted, but if it is
written in read mode, the file becomes untainted. The open() and read() calls are used for
tainting the memory blocks as well as new files. The data in memory read from tainted
file are marked similarly and the files, which are read from tainted memory blocks become
tainted too. However, data in memory are also directly propagated.
Since the Aurasium can intercept only specific places (system calls) and not instruction
itself, it is impossible to implement full-scope memory-level tainting as is introduced by
TaintDroid. This is replaced by the newly designed data-level tainting concept. This
concept together with the file-level tainting is depicted in figure 4.5. When the data are
read from the file, the content of data is read and tagged using a hash function which
assigns a unique number. This tag, together with the size of block is used during the
writing unknown memory block into the file. Each unknown memory block is tested with
respect to any existing hash and marked as tainted if the hash matches. Subsequently, the
file is marked as tainted as well.
Figure 4.5: Design of Architecture
The final policy enforcement is performed using the interception of ioctl() call. Specif-
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ically, when the BR TRANSACTION command which contains destination component Content-
Provider is read, all the read() calls for the tainted files are in the mode of restriction. The
project is proposed to secure the user-selected files or folders as an entity, which are in-
tended to be invariable like images, pictures or videos. Documents that are often changed
can be restricted for opening, or there can be assigned unique rights for opening to hard-
ened application and the files are encrypted for other applications. In this Inverse Mode
(IM), data is protected with unhardened applications and uncovered and possibly exploited
by the hardened application. The inverse mode is designed as optional and may not be
implemented. A further extension is finer granularity of data-tainting. Unknown memory
block which is being written to file is compared against the tainted memory blocks which
are smaller than the unknown memory block, and the memory block which is being read
from file has been divided into smaller units with separate hash.
Data structure which works as TaintDroid’s VTM is designed as a simple array of mem-
ory blocks, which is the interconnection part between the file system level and application
logic performing described data-tainting. From designed perspective, each memory block
is considered as tainted or untainted. Application can store only tainted data and other
will be implicit. Initially, the user-selected files are marked as tainted and during the taint-
ing process, the other files and new memory blocks are added. Each memory block has
assigned only one file which is the source of its data, one counted hash tag, but a lot of
destination files to which this data is written. Due to TC, also the file modes need to be
stored, because read() and write() functions do not dispose with this information in the
passed arguments. The figure A.3 shows the pseudocode of the designed data structures
for this tainting process.
Regarding the configuration possibilities, the main purpose is to allow the selection
of private files and folders. Since the two previously-mentioned tainting mechanisms are
preferred in different situations, the setting of selected mechanism is also appropriate. Hash-
only tainting can be used in situations where the low memory consumption is important,
while the content-based scanning in the case of files which need better protection. In some
cases, there is also a need to disable the tainting completely due to performance slowdown.
The restriction can be performed explicitly as well as dynamically. Explicit (static) restric-
tion can be used in situations which require protection from theft or unauthorized users.
One exemplary utilization includes parental control. Dynamic enforcement can be realized
using confirmation screen and is useful for its flexibility. It is also appropriate to consider
the configuration of permanent restriction where the selected protected files can not be
even read by hardened application. The configuration settings can be assigned to each
application separately or centrally. GUI can be also resolved as a single central application
which communicates which hardened applications or as injected screen in each application.
For the purposes of this project, the first variant is chosen. The advantage is an easier
configuration for multiple applications at once, usability and better overview of the whole
configuration in one place. However, there is security issue related to the communication
between configuration application and the hardened ones. The communication is designed
via configuration file for its simplicity. This file should be secured to ensure mainly the
data integrity. Returning back, the usage with the permanent restriction, especially as a
parental control, requires the password protection of configuration application itself.
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CHAPTER 5 IS NOT PUBLISHED
Chapter 6
Verification
The testing of application is distributed across the various phases of the software develop-
ment. There are used different approaches on the different testing hierarchy levels based
on these phases. Since this thesis is not interested in a creating of a commercial product,
there are not performed acceptance tests with the third-party persons. On the other hand,
there are conducted mainly the developer-side tests – unit tests and assembly tests, as well
as the black-box tests – function tests and system tests as is shown in figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: Peformed Tests According to Hierarchy Level
Since the application implementation is rooted in a deep theoretical knowledge of Aura-
sium framework as well as the principles of Android platform on the lowest level, the
essential fundament of verification is theoretical assessment and evaluation of the testing
outputs and the overall project outcomes.
6.1 Testing
In the integration phase, there is tested standalone Aurasium framework functionality
against the several Android versions before and after debugging and porting to newer An-
droid version. The chosen methodology is developing the simple testing application which
reads and writes to file. Then, there are evaluated the results from intercepted system
calls with the obtained theoretical knowledge. The next phase, experiments, is concerned
with the assembly testing with the real selected applications – IO File Manager and the
Ted Text Editor. There is tested system calls monitoring of Aurasium Framework in a
real environment. However, the main purpose is to pre-prepare and verify the testing en-
vironment itself for the subsequent testing of implemented modifications. In the further
phase – implementation – there are performed assembly tests with the developed mocking
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environment. The mocking environment is implemented as the simple standalone C++ ap-
plication with the several predefined test scenarios. Test scenarios are sequences of system
calls inserted to the testing environment using #include directive and designed according
to performed experiments which are intended to test a specific part of the tainting mecha-
nism. The system output, as is outlined in a previous figure 5.2, can be performed also in
this environment.
The implemented hook functions have been integrated into the real environment – firstly
into the simple testing application which is only capable of reading and writing to file, then
in a pre-prepared mocking environment with the two chosen publicly-available open-source
applications –IO File Manager and Ted (Text Editor). The testing has been carried out
by designed logging to files. Especially, the content of pe log taint map.txt has been
important, because there is tracked the content of all tainting structures in time, which is
the only output of tainting process. The final restriction is tested performing the black-box
function test with the manually repackaged application IO File Manager and Ted Text
Editor. Manual repackaging of applications is important during the testing phase, because
the automated repackaging script is working on the level of smali assembler and creates
APK installation files instead of application source code which is compilable and testable
using e.g. debugging techniques. In OI File Manager has been tested tainting mechanism,
final restriction using two different methods and communication with the configuration
activity. Regarding tainting mechanism, there has been performed actions “move”, “copy”,
“rename”, “open” as well as “send” operation in order to test the proposed test scenarios
in real hardened application. Action “delete” is not considered in the system, but is also
taken into account for future improvements – e.g. disabling its operation on tainted files.
The second application, Ted (Text Editor), is used for testing of explicit restriction. There
are conducted three scenarios – opening the unprotected file, opening the protected file in
empty data falsifying mode and opening the protected file in fake data falsifying type.
The configuration application, as well as overall functionality of the system, has been
consequently tested utilizing the manual system testing. There has been proposed several
test cases and their expected outcomes and tested accordingly. Especially, the application
has been tested with regard to sharing data using Bluetooth, Wi-fi, SMS, Email and other
channels [B.5]. The outcomes of this testing in OI File Manager Application is illustrated
in table 6.1.
All sharing methods have been tested on various types of media files – text files, images,
animated GIFs and audio files. As regards the sharing via email clients, the application has
been tested on two different clients, each of them behave correspondingly. The standard
Email application from Google Inc. is not treated for the interception and is not started
when the restriction is considered, whilst the Email application from LG company handles
the unexpected results from query() function and is started with the empty attachment
[B.7]. However, in both cases, the private data is protected. A special case is the MLO Task
Management Tool application, which does not share the data immediately, but stores the
attachment in a local database. However, since the application added the synchronization
between multiple devices, the data are also sent via network later. However, the application
is restricted at the start, so the restriction is also effective. All the tests have been carried out
on the real Android device running the hardened applications compiled with Android 4.3.1
build target. The testing device runs on Android version 4.1.2. The testing using Android
Virtual Device (AVD) or utilizing the Genymotion R○ [21] Android Emulator is limited,
because the sharing possibilities are lacking standard applications as well as the resources –
mobile network connection or Bluetooth adapter. The tests have also been performed on
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Sharing Method Application Outcome without Re-
striction
Outcome after Restric-
tion
Email Gmail Email is sent Application is not started
Email by LG Email is sent Application is started with
empty attachment
Bluetooth Bluetooth File is sent Sending failed on sending
device
SMS Messaging by LG SMS is sent as MMS Application is not started
with image attachment.
Runs with text attachment,
because it cannot handle it
even without restriction
IM Google+ Message is sent Application is not started
Hangouts Message is sent Application is not started
Other MLO 2 Files is added to list Application is started with
empty attachment
FX File Manager File is saved in another loca-
tion
Application is not started
Table 6.1: Testing of Final Restriction in OI File Manager Application
the OI File Manager application repackaged using automatic Aurasium script resulting
with the expected isomorphic behaviour. The application GUI responds as expected and
the private data are protected in all the cases.
Since the repackaging script is a part of Aurasium project itself, the testing of repack-
aging mechanism gives the isomorphic results as expected. The following table 6.2 adapted
from Xu et al.’s article shows the overall evaluation.
Type of Application Number of Applications Repackaging Success Rate
App store corpus 3491 99.6% (3476)
Malware corpus 1260 99.8% (1258)
Table 6.2: Repackaging Evaluation Results [44]
Repackaging introduces only negligible part of the code in Java and the resulting added
size of the introduced C code – 46.4 KB– is not relevant with regard to the large libraries
and another code already included in original Aurasium implementation, the size increase
after the repackaging corresponds to the original Aurasium implementation as is shown in
figure 6.2.
With regard to the performance evaluation, tests have been conducted on real Android
device LG L9 (P760) with 1 GHz processor, 1 GB of system memory and 4 GB internal
storage. Startup time of hardened applications is considerably changed. Aurasium’s over-
writing of Global Offset Table entries is consuming operation and lasts approximately 10 s
as is shown in following table 6.3.
Application Original (ms) Repackaged (ms) Time Slowdown (ms)
Ted (Text Editor) 1016 1056 1184 11187 11040 11236 10x 10069
OI File Manager 729 830 645 11132 10238 10694 15x 9953
Table 6.3: Startup Time Slowdown on Repackaged Applications
The performance of the selected actions has been tested on the original application
before repackaging, on the repackaged application with the inactive tainting and restric-
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Figure 6.2: Size Increase After Repackaging in Original Aurasium [44]
tion and on the repackaged application with the active protection. The aim of this tests
is to identify application performance from the user perspective and detect unexpected
performance behaviour which could also lead to the discovery of hidden error and covert
vulnerabilities. In order to determine real performance, all logging outputs are disabled.
Since the time has been measured using logging outputs as well as by manual measure-
ment, it is measured repeatedly in order to estimate deviations and accuracy. There is also
calculated overhead of the repackaged application with active functional protection. The
performance of restricting has been tested on two actions – sending via email and sending
via Bluetooth, as is shown in table 6.4.
Action Method Original (ms) Inactive (ms) Active (ms) Gain
Send via
Email
Mediation 1079 1047 922 1469 1258 1515 1320 1368 1336 32%File Protection 1226 1297 1351 27%
Send via
Bluetooth
Mediation 445 382 508 992 953 914 985 961 1000 121%File Protection 1144 1047 1063 144%
Table 6.4: Performance of Sharing Actions with Restriction
The times are subtracted from standard Android log messages. The overhead in Blue-
tooth application has been significantly bigger than Email application, which has been
caused by different implementation and reaction on unexpected condition caused by in-
troduced restriction. As is shown in the previous table, the time of processing is more
dependent on the application which handles the action, than the method of restriction.
The tainting performance has been tested for combinations of scanning type and pro-
tection of copied file regarding configuration. Specifically, there is measured a duration
of paste action between the start and end of the copy process. The results in table 6.5
show limitations of this test, because slowdown is too small to be obtained by this method.
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However, since the test is aimed at user experience, the result is satisfactory, because the
performance of the hardened application remains almost the same even during the active
protection.
Action Scanning Original (ms) Inactive (ms) Active (ms) Gain
Untainted
Copying
File-based
2394 2479 2421 2675 2643 2647
2787 2608 2778 12%
Content-based 2665 2784 2586 10%
Tainted
Copying
File-based 2707 2626 2596 9%
Content-based 2792 2735 2663 12%
Table 6.5: Testing of Tainting Performance
The last test is focused on the performance of file opening and reading during increased
threat level mode. The worst results are obtained during the enabled protection with fake
data falsifying, because the data must be overwritten in system memory [tab. 6.6]. Empty
data falsifying protection is faster compared to the previous method, but still represents
about 20% overhead against the unhardened application.
Action Data Type Original (ms) Inactive (ms) Active (ms) Gain
File Opening Empty Data 736 732 704 1881 1425 1357 948 859 816 21%Fake Data 1901 1438 1513 23%
Table 6.6: Time of File Opening During Increased Threat Level
To summarize the performance test results, the startup time overhead of repackaged
applications is the biggest performance drawback. Otherwise, there can be seen some
slowdown, but it is nearly transparent to the user and does not represent an obstacle to the
use. The average slowdown is, in most cases, similar to Aurasium’s proposed intercepted
actions in [44].
6.2 Evaluation
The overall system can automatically repackage the selected applications and then dy-
namically enforce the security policy for sharing selected files. Nevertheless, the unrelated
operation and functionality of the hardened application remains unchanged and can be
utilized as before. The application offers simple GUI for selection of private files and con-
figuration of desired behaviour or stopping the security scanning completely. The main
benefit is the security refinement. Aurasium mediation is reliable in the most cases due to
sophisticated monitoring of system calls on the layer lower, than application layer used by
most programmers.
In order to achieve these results, there has been researched the principles of operating
systems, primarily Linux OS, the principles of Android OS from the security perspective
and examined and compared several frameworks with the similar functionality than the
analyzed the Aurasium framework. After that, the Aurasium framework has been critically
studied in detail and analyzed its code due to insufficient documentation. The Aurasium
has been documented and tested its functionality on the older Android API platform.
Subsequently, it has been mapped to newer Android version and investigated automatic
repackaging script in Bash and Python language. After that, there has been proposed
the first application design and chosen the suitable publicly-available application. Then,
the applications have been manually repackaged and the experiments upon them have
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been performed. Subsequently, the proof of concept has been implemented performing
the restriction mechanism. After that, the overall solution has been designed. The next
step was developing the mocking environment and implementation and testing the tainting
mechanism. This has been followed by integration in a real environment – the simple testing
application, and the real open-source applications. Consequently, the configuration activity
has been developed and tested. Lastly, the overall system has been tested.
The hardest part of this process is the understanding of the Aurasium design without
documentation as well as the collecting and associating the information from a number of
sources addressing various disciplines as operating systems, Android platform, compilers
and dynamic linking, various existing software (Aurasium and other frameworks) and tools
(console tools, projects utilized in solution itself). A necessary prerequisite is also the un-
derstanding and analysis of code written as in native-based C/C++ language as in Java
bytecode and scripting languages Bash and Python. The biggest challenge in the project is
also the finding the design of resulting solution as well as the finding the path in order to
realize this design using limited resources – the lack of documentation, the lack of theoret-
ical background, limited building blocks, limited time and other shortcomings like bugs in
Aurasium or shortcomings in development environment (inability to debug native code in
repackaged applications).
The main benefit is also in the theoretical outcomes and the design of solution which
exceeds the actual implementations in the scope and a number of proposed extensions. The
personal benefit of this work is in better orientation and understanding of code programmed
by another developer. Aurasium framework, as well as other frameworks and tools, provides
interesting solutions to the general problems and design patterns which can be reused in
other projects. The benefit is also greater ability to interconnect and reuse these ready-made
solutions. Another theoretical outcome is understanding of all-pervasive communication
using Android binder in Android OS as well as the other principles of Android OS from the
lower perspective and operating systems in general. From the programmers perspective,
biggest asset is the understanding Java JNI principles and possibilities and ability to develop
a native-based application in Android platform. The more general benefit is also the ability
to independently define, solve and assess the problems. There has also been designed a
number of extensions for further development in chapter 4.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The aim of this work was to provide the system for securing the user-selected private data
of chosen applications with the sandboxing mechanism. In the first phase, interprocess
communication and existing frameworks, which are capable of intercepting communica-
tion between the application and the operating system on the level of system calls, are
explored. Subsequently, the possibilities and the code of the one of the compared frame-
works – Aurasium framework – are investigated. From this analysis, the framework has been
modified to be able to build and proper run on the required Android version, and there
were conducted experiments in order to propose and realize the tainting mechanism as well
as the security policy enforcement.
The system performs the file-based tainting of selected files using hash calculation
and content-based tainting using division of file content into “small blocks”. The restric-
tion is implemented intercepting the communication with an external application using
ContentProvider interface and via falsifying the file content. There is also developed
restriction based on falsifying the whole files on the file system. Application introduces
communication with the configuration application utilizing the configuration file, which is
similar than low-level Android binder communication. Configuration options include the
type of scanning, type of restriction, method of intercepting or static restriction of file
opening.
The system has been developed and tested in three different types of environment –
in mocking C++ environment, in selected hardened test applications and in Aurasium
repackaging system. The C++ environment is prepared on Linux machine with several
test scenarios, the hardened applications are mostly tested on the real Android device
using the Android IDE and the Aurasium repackaging system is tested by replacing the
monitoring code in the original ApkMonitor package.
This work investigates the security problems in Android and significantly contributes
to understanding its security architecture. There are aggregated principles from different
disciplines and designed multiple figures to facilitate explanation. The work has also been
awarded at Excel@FIT 2016 [8] student conference for the independent scientific approach
and the elaboration quality. It is also chosen between 5 best scientific contributions and is
about to be printed in SERSC journals [38].
The next steps are the code optimization, design, and implementation of the secure
communication between configuration activity and the hardened applications, addressing
and handling the file permissions or the implementation of several proposed extensions. The
next work can be also aimed at developing the automated configuration and risk analysis,
unique handling the files according to the type of media (image, video, text files), expanding
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the configuration options, focusing on the possibilities of the Linux core or further testing,
experimenting and research.
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Appendix A
Pseudocodes
1 struct binder_write_read {
2 signed long write_size; /* Bytes to Write */
3 signed long write_consumed; /* Bytes Consumed by Driver */
4 unsigned long write_buffer;
5 signed long read_size; /* Bytes to Read */
6 signed long read_consumed; /* Bytes Consumed by Driver */
7 unsigned long read_buffer;
8 };
9
Figure A.1: Pseudocode of binder write read Structure
1 struct binder_transaction_data {
2 union {
3 __u32 handle; /* Target Descriptor of Command Transaction */
4 binder_uintptr_t ptr; /* Target Descriptor of Return Transaction */
5 } target;
6 binder_uintptr_t cookie; /* Target Object Cookie */
7 __u32 code; /* Transaction Command */
8
9 /* General Information about the Transaction. */
10 __u32 flags;
11 pid_t sender_pid;
12 uid_t sender_euid;
13 binder_size_t data_size; /* Number of Bytes of Data */
14 binder_size_t offsets_size; /* Number of Bytes of Offsets */
15
16 /* Transaction Data */
17 union {
18 struct {
19 binder_uintptr_t buffer; /* Transaction Data */
20 binder_uintptr_t offsets; /* Offsets to flat_binder_object Structs */
21 } ptr;
22 __u8 buf [8];
23 } data;
24 }
Figure A.2: Pseudocode of binder transaction data Structure
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1 class SmallBlock {
2 unsigned long start;
3 char block[SMALL_BLOCK_SIZE ];
4 };
5
6 class MemBlock {
7 unsigned long start; /* Start Address */
8 int size; /* Size of Memory Block */
9 int fdSrc; /* Source File Descriptor */
10 TaintedFile fpSrc; /* Full Path of Source File */
11 unsigned char hash [32]; /* Counted Hash */
12 };
13
14 std::vector <MemBlock *> taintMap; /* List of Tainted Memory Blocks */
15
16 std::vector <SmallBlock *> smallBlocks; /* Blocks of Stored Information */
17
18
Figure A.3: Pseudocode of Data Structures for Tainting
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Appendix B
Application Screenshots
Figure B.1: Main Screen of Configuration
Activity Figure B.2: Selection of Private Files
Figure B.3: Settings in Configuration Ac-
tivity
Figure B.4: Information Screen in Con-
figuration Activity
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Figure B.5: Sample of Sharing Possibili-
ties
Figure B.6: Sample of Confirmation Di-
alog
Figure B.7: Sample of Restriction Using
Communication Mediation Method
Figure B.8: Sample of Restriction Using
File Protection Method
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Appendix C
DVD Content
This technical report is accompanied by 3 DVD Dual Layer (8.5 GB). It contains the com-
pressed VirtualBox R○Virtual Machine with Xubuntu R○ Linux OS divided into three parts.
The main content – source files of application and TEX system, test files and additional
presentation material is located on DVD 1. The application source files include –PE Pri-
vate Files configuration Android application, original and pre-prepared repackaged OI File
Manager and Ted (Text Editor) Android applications, as well as original and modificated
Aurasium open-source project with the introduced monitoring code handling the tainting
and restriction mechanism, and repackaging script. A presentation material contains ma-
terial from Excel@FIT conference – a poster, pitch slide and insight image – in addition to
the slides for presentation. There are also included designed logos, icons and other graphics
invented as part of this thesis.
DVD 1
/tex TEX Source Files
/src Application Source Files
/test Application Test Files
/pres Presentation Material for Diploma Thesis
/vm VirtualBox R○Virtual Machine (Part 1)
/Diploma Thesis.pdf Diploma Thesis in Electronic Format
/Diploma Thesis – Public.pdf Diploma Thesis in Electronic Format
(Public Version)
DVD 2
/vm VirtualBox R○Virtual Machine (Part 2)
DVD 3
/vm VirtualBox R○Virtual Machine (Part 3)
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